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Reactions to Oppression: Jurisgenesis
in the Jurispathic State
John Valery White
If there existed two legal orders with identical legal precepts and
identical, predictable patterns of public force, they would nonetheless
differ essentially in meaning if, in one of the orders, the precepts were




Traditional jurisprudence has been criticized for conceiving as homogeneous
the world in which law operates.2 According to this criticism, traditional
jurisprudence assumes that democratic representation,' majoritarian consensus,
4
and principled decisions necessarily create a neutral and just order.5
Many scholars have argued that the world in which law operates is not
homogeneous and that the assumptions underlying traditional jurisprudence are
therefore invalid.6 Some of these scholars suggest that the application of
traditional jurisprudential frameworks to situations involving people of color
is unjust because the views of people of color have not been incorporated in
1. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4,
7 (1983) (footnote omitted).
2. This criticism is implicit in intellectual inferiority and meritocracy standards arguments. See Kennedy,
Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1751-54 (1989) (discussing intellectual
inferiority theories as basis for emerging racial critiques).
3. See R. WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (2d ed. 1976) (questioning legitimacy of democratic
representation).
4. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962) (discussing countermajoritarian difficulty).
5. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
6. The Critical Legal Studies Movement (CLS), feministjurisprudence, and Critical Race Theory make
such claims. This Note will focus on the latter movement. See generally Matsuda, When the First Quail
-Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989) (students
of color forced to deny personal experiences to apply traditional standards).
For a definition of who are critical race theorists see Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.L 758,
759 & n.6 (including Professors Mari Matsuda, Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, and Patricia Williams); see
also Johnson, The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2006 (1991) (including as critical race theorists Black
professors who are critical of voice-of-color concept); Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case For Affirmative
Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705, 706 & nn.4-5 (Duncan Kennedy).
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that jurisprudence. 7 They contend that traditional jurisprudence is neither neu-
tral8 nor legitimate and imposes not justice, but power.'
In support of their criticisms of traditional jurisprudence, some scholars of
color have begun to develop a jurisprudence that examines law, liberation, and
justice within the context of racial oppression. Based on the experiences of"op-
pressed communities," the work of these scholars professes to offer a concep-
tion of the law that captures oppressed communities alternative views of law,
liberation, and justice.10
This alternative jurisprudence's primary problem is that in attempting to
emphasize the unity of the oppressed communities' perspective, it often inaccu-
rately reflects the diverse viewpoints of the communities." While a jurispru-
dence reflecting the views of oppressed people is both valuable and necessary,
if it is inaccurate, misleading, or if it espouses only the views of oppressed
communities' elites, it marginalizes the oppressed at least as much as traditional
jurisprudence does.
This Note offers a model for analyzing the political and legal traditions of
oppressed communities and developing a jurisprudence that accurately reflects
the communities' views.' 2 Under this model, each of these diverse views can
be understood from one of four perspectives: parochialism, fatalism, neo-liberal-
ism, and individualism. These four perspectives are defined by an oppressed
community's members' aspirations for liberation. Different ideals of justice and
liberation underlie each perspective. Though touching on some of the com-
munities' sentiments, the examinations of scholars of color have thus far been
largely piecemeal, overemphasizing certain views, unwittingly combining
divergent views, or marginalizing and dismissing unpopular views. 3
7. See, e.g., Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984).
8. Alternative jurisprudence is antineutral. See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1746, 1760-87 (racial
distinctiveness theses of Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, and Mari Matsuda).
9. See, e.g., Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea For Narrative, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2411, 2413-16 (1989) (dominant group creates stories making current social arrangements seem fair
and natural).
10. "[Tjhose who have experienced discrimination speak with a special voice to which we should
listen." Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L
REV. 323, 324 (1987). "The strength of Critical Race Scholarship is its identification of the commonality
of minority experience." Espinoza, Masks and Other Disguises: Exposing Legal Academia, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1878, 1885 (1990).
11. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1778-87 (Matsuda "homogenizes" oppressed communities).
12. Adopting a simplistic, bipolar conception of the oppressed community as Black people and the
oppressor community as white people and the state and using examples from Black social and political
history for illustration, this Note will show how the model's four perspectives view four cases with white
and Black actors and victims. For the purpose of illustration, I bracket various other community definitions
that may exist, such as communities defined by class, gender, age, or national origin. Such a simplistic racial
model is of limited value; however, I use it because it is familiar and retains considerable force in popular
discourse. Also, the state is associated with the white community both for simplicity and because in
oppressed communities the state generally has been regarded as a tool of oppressor communities.
13. Professor Stephen Carter has noted this marginalization:
[Tlhe different voice hypothesis is at the very least either too broad or too narrow-that is, either
it sweeps under its ambit even the works of those scholars of color who would deny that their
2728 [Vol. 100: 2727
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After defining the model, Part II argues that the four perspectives are funda-
mentally inconsistent with each other. It then evaluates from each perspective
four similar, violative acts involving community members as victims, perpetra-
tors, both, or neither, demonstrating each perspective's different conception of
justice. To illustrate the model's value as an analytical tool, Part III analyzes
two articles by scholars of color. It argues that, with an unclear or incomplete
framework guiding their examination, scholars of color cloud the jurisprudence
they attempt to illuminate. t4
II. THE COMMUNITY MODEL
At times, oppressed communities seem to regard criminal law violations
with clear and overt apathy. On other occasions, they call vehemently for
enforcement of those same laws. In April 1989, a twenty-eight-year-old white
woman was beaten and raped while jogging in northern Central Park, the result
of a night of marauding by Black and Latino teenagers. 15 Certainly the Black
community thought the rape/assault was abhorrent; 6 however, there have been
recurring references among Blacks to feelings of "otherness"' 7 and the state's
role in creating despair"8 in inner-city youths; to protectionist attitudes within
the community; 19 and to calls for the unmerciful, immediate, and harsh state
punishment of the perpetrators." What is the source of these apparently con-
tradictory reactions to clear violations of fellow human beings? Is there a coher-
ent way of understanding different reactions in African-American communities
to seemingly similar cases, for example the Howard Beach killing2' versus
a similar killing involving only whites? What is the nature of the variety of
these responses and how are they influenced by oppression?
The following model will show that any community whose fundamental
self-conception is as oppressed will not view liberation and thus life and justice
voice is different, or it in effect denies them their birthright as members of... the non-white
community.
Carter, The Best Black. And Other Tales, I RECONSTRUCTION No. 1, 1990, at 6, 31.
14. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 6 (tripartite classification of critical race theorists analogous to
Critical Feminist Theory: Hierarchal Majoritarianism, Monism, and emerging Nationalism) and Peller, supra
note 6 (employing frame of integrationism and nationalism).
15. Pitt, Gang Attack Unusual for its Viciousness, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1989, at B 1, col. 2.
16. Sturz, IVhat Kids Who Aren't Wolves Say About Wilding, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1989, at A17, col.
2 ("perpetrators should be dealt with harshly").
17. See Chace, Safety in the Park: In Women's Hands, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1989, at A31, col. 1.
18. See Sturz, supra note 16.
1 "Some are so concerned to defend their community from what they see as racial slurs.... [Hiad
the victim been black, there would have been far less publicity and outrage." Chira, Rape Suspects'
Neighbors Feel Accused, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1989, at AI, col. 3.
20. Sturz, supra note 16, at A17, col. 2.
21. Patricia Williams describes the "Howard Beach case" (Black men beaten and chased into freeway
by white teenagers; one Black man was killed by oncoming car) in terms of tensions between community
safety and racial discrimination. Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing
as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 136-50 (1987).
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monolithicly. The model will outline the alternative ways a hypothetical op-
pressed community will incorporate questions of life, liberation, and justice into
its jurisprudence.
A. Defining the Model
Professor Robert Cover proposed that every insular community has its own
normative universe in which it develops its own, insular legal tradition; this he
calledjurisgenesis.'- Jurisgenesis exists independently of states and takes place
through an essentially cultural medium?3 Cover described a world in which
states arise not to impose law where none existed but to suppress a plethora
of competing legal traditions; he termed this the state's "jurispathic tenden-
cy.''2 Cover's state, while it establishes law, simultaneously destroys it.'
In establishing law, Cover's state destroys legal traditions that aid daily func-
tioning within our diverse communities. Jurisgenesis drives the development
of jurisprudential perspectives in our hypothetical community.
Our hypothetical community has a heritage of oppression by other commu-
nities and the state (the historical construction). The oppressed community's
basic concern, and thus the substance of its discourse, is liberation. How it
intends to achieve liberation is governed by its views of the nature of oppres-
sion. Its view of justice is then determined by its plan for liberation. For our
oppressed community all noncommunity members are associated with the
oppressive state.'s Such a view of life creates a world of the oppressed us
versus the oppressive them. All intercommunity relationships are characterized
as conflict-laden and exploitative.
The community's heritage of oppression and its resulting pursuit of libera-
tion reveal four perspectives on life which in turn guide its member's concep-
tions of justice.27 The four perspectives-parochialism, fatalism, neo-liberal-
ism, and individualism-each attempt to rebel against and destroy the oppres-
sive order while simultaneously vying for survival in the oppressive environ-
ment.' No single perspective, of course, exists in pure form. A community
member is likely to possess some combination of perspectives. The value of
22. Cover, supra note 1, at 4-11, 42.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 40.
25. Id. at 44 & passim.
26. Membership in the community may be defined by the historical construction's claim over a person
via a substantive element of the historical story, such as race, color, or national origin. See, e.g., Himes,
A Sociological Redefinition of the American Negro Group, 9 PHYLON 125 (1948).
27. This Note assumes that the four perspectives exist in other communities that define themselves
through quite different, but parallel, historical constructions. That is to say, the matrix that defines the four
perspectives here lies within a larger, parallel matrix defining the perspectives of the larger society. As such,
the oppressed community differs from the larger society essentially because of its distinct historical
construction. The oppressed community survives only because of the accuracy and/or persuasiveness of the
historical construction and the success of the community members in promoting that construction.
28. Cover, supra note 1, at 9.
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this model is that, given a particular issue, one perspective dominates a person's
impressions.
The answers to two questions highlight the differences between the four
perspectives. First, the community must decide whether to develop its own view
of life, liberation, and justice or to simply accept the state's (society's) view.29
Second, judgments about the nature of life, liberation, and justice may be
governed by material concerns rooted in the community's oppressed condition
or more detached, abstract principles.30 The members of the community must
decide whether they are to conduct the liberative project themselves or whether
abstract or noncommunity entities such as liberal society, God, truth, or individ-
ual effort will end their community's oppressed condition.
The first perspective is insular and concerned with material improvement.
Its views are closely connected to the narrative of life as oppressive. The
empirical assessment behind parochialism holds the state solely responsible for
the community's oppression. Its normative vision considers the prospect of
liberation to be dependent upon the outcome of a combative relationship
between the community and the state. Life is unjust and justice can only be
won through community unity and intercommunity conflict.
The controlling ethic of parochialists is material liberation of the insular
community from the state. The legal tradition of parochialism thus rejects the
jurispathic state and its law. Justice requires the destruction of the oppressive
law or, alternatively, the creation of an autonomous community legal system
parallelling the larger system.
31
29. Acceptance could be based on a theory that the state legitimately represents a consensus among
competing individuals' and communities' moral constructions or that the state's view embodies a conception
of objective and universal justice. The subject of inquiry here is whether justice is community-based or
universal. If the community is incapable of legitimately making moral determinations, those determinations
must either be made by undifferentiated individuals or an abstract order-such as natural law or the
state-which transcends individuals.
30. This question is not unlike the distinction drawn by Thomas Ross between the opinions of Justices
Marshall and Scalia in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989): "Scalia's opinion as
narrative is... abstract story.... Scalia never speaks concretely about any case or context.... Marshall
tells not only the stories of the particular dispute, but also the stories of the city ... as the capital of the
Confederacy, the place of 'apartheid,' ... with a disgraceful history." Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68
TEX. L. REV. 381, 390-91 (1989). The answer to this question implicates the degree to which a community
is pessimistic or optimistic about the prospect of liberation and justice under the oppressive order.
31. Popular conceptions of the Black Panthers are consistent with this pure view. The Panthers were
perceived as a guerrilla warfare unit prepared to overthrow the state if they were not allowed to govern
themselves and their community autonomously. See R. BRISBANE, BLACK ACTIVISM: RACIAL REVOLUTION
IN THE UNITED STATES 1954-1970, at 193-222 (1974).
A more accurate example of parochialism is the Republic of New Afrika (RNA). The RNA declared
its independence from the United States on March 31, 1968. Lumumba, Short History of the U.S. War on
the R.N.A., THE BLACK SCHOLAR, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 72. In 1969, the RNA demanded $200 billion in
reparations from the United States Government and the surrender of five southern states to establish the
New Afrikan Nation. R. BRISBANE, supra note 31, at 183. The RNA established a provincial government
in exile and developed a plan to liberate the five states through electoral victories or armed struggle. Id.
at 183. By 197 1, the RNA fell apart after the arrest of many of its members and a shootout with police near
Jackson, Mississippi. Lumumba, supra, at 73-74.
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While intuitively appealing, parochialism is not sacrosanct or universally
embraced by the oppressed community. Parochialism demands violent revolt
32
and autarky; accordingly, the ideology can be pessimistic and depressing,3 3
especially when the prospect of successful martial revolution is remote. Despite
the limits of this perspective, it is influential because, among other things, it
attempts to address the community's pervasive feeling of oppression. It cele-
brates the history of oppression, reinforcing the community's definition, and
calls for solidarity and fraternity in the battered and embattled community.
The second view retains the insular understanding of parochialism but
renders an escapist conclusion.' Life, liberation, and justice all operate as
functions of a higher order that governs the insular group. The community is
oppressed for an abstract reason such as destiny or God's will. Normatively,
liberation will be found in "truth" or some after-life; there is no need to change
the present world order. Fatalism's conception of liberation is, nonetheless, still
insular and maintains that the community and the state oppose each other.
For fatalism the controlling ethic is higher truth. This ethic requires rejection
of earthly law, even martyrdom.35 Living by faith, death is purifying and
significant because it marks the end of a long battle with the physical and pas-
sage into the proverbial promised land.
36
The appeal of fatalism is limited, though. Fatalism abandons the hope of
changing the world, investing all its adherents' energies in an "otherworldly"
reality. It fails to address the injustice presupposed by the community's con-
struction of history. It does not feed mouths, nor does it necessarily free the
mind. Indeed, it may prepare the mind for further bondage. Because fatalist
community members live in the "real world" and fatalism operates in the "other
world," fatalism cannot exist in pure form. Fatalists must construct "real world"
32. "But violence has its limitations-it can be put down with superior force." R. BRISBANE, supra
note 31, at 159. By violence, I mean more than armed rebellion; this conception of violence encompasses
political and legal action. Cf. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1605 (1986) (recognizing
violence of legal interpretive process).
33. Parochialism paints a picture of life in which the group is defined only as oppressed and downtrod-
den. To compensate, parochialist constructions must proffer an uplifting portrait of the prospects of
liberation.
34. See, e.g., Speech by Martin Luther King, Jr., I See the Promised Land (Apr. 3, 1968), reprinted
in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 1929-1968, at 279-86
(J. Washington ed. 1986). Martin Luther King, Jr. provides an example of how people and movements shift
as issues change; he can be located in all four perspectives. See id. and infra note 39.
35. "Martyrs require that any future they possess will be on the terms of the law to which they are
committed (God's law).., even in the face of world-destroying pain.... [Tlhe interpretive commitments
of a community which resists official law must also be realized in the flesh, even if it be the flesh of its
own adherents." Cover, supra notes 32, at 1604-05.
36. Fatalism is located in the Black church in what James Cone calls the "'white lie' that Christianity
is primarily concerned with an otherworldly reality." J. CONE, BLACK THEOLOGY AND BLACK POWER 121
(1969). Indeed, fatalism is most prominently exemplified in the early Black church. "Black men were
expected to accept their lot in this world and if they were obedient and honest and truthful they would be
rewarded in the world after death." E. FRAZIER, THE NEGRO CHURCH IN AMERICA 19 (1974 ed.) (reprinted
with C. LINCOLN, THE BLACK CHURCH SINCE FRAZIER (1974)). It was not necessary to create a just world,
for the world is not a place for justice.
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dogmas to link their otherworldly vision to their real world existence. Fatalism
places no limit on what may constitute dogma, making the operation of fatalism
in the "real world" essentially amoral.
37
The third view, neo-liberalism, rejects the pessimistic and insular outlooks
of both material and visionary parochialism. It accepts that the we/they con-
struction exists; however, its normative vision suggests that liberation will be
achieved through the destruction of insular communities.38 For neo-liberals,
the problem with life is not necessarily oppression itself but the existence of
insular communities which manifest that oppression. Neo-liberals see the
community as at least partially responsible for its oppressed situation because
it clings to the narrow, insular conception implicit in the we/they construction.
Neo-liberalism embraces the ethic that "all [people] are created equal." Liber-
ation will come and justice be found when people can live their lives unenicum-
bered by labels or the interference of other individuals.
39
However, the neo-liberal perspective undermines the community to the
degree that it demands a world in which right and wrong are universal and
objective. Its universalist view subverts the community's we/they construction.
Its quest for universalism only succeeds in narrowing the definitions of commu-
nities, not eliminating them altogether.' Its rejection of groups validates the
individual's self-interested pursuits, undercutting interests of humanity generally
and community interests particularly. Depriving subcommunities of their
historical legitimacy, neo-liberalism embraces the existing state and oppressive
society while it resists states and parochial orders generally. Hence, neo-liberal-
ism ignores oppressors who decide against foregoing their privileged status.
Neo-liberalism proves unable to change oppressive societies which undeniably
37. Fatalism remains influential, however. It makes it possible for people to survive seemingly
insurmountable conditions even if it does not change "reality." As Frazier's analysis of the Negro church
points out, it "turned [Black people's] minds from the sufferings and privations of this world to a world
after death where the weary would find rest and the victims of injustices would be compensated." E.
FRAZIER, supra note 36, at 50. Hence, fatalism often lends spiritual force to combined perspectives.
38. This perspective categorizes only community members, not people with a universalist vision who
lack membership in or reject the existence of the community and then call for the destruction of group
distinctions.
Professor Johnson's "Hierarchical Majoritarian" category resembles a neo-liberal view. Johnson, supra
note 6, part I. However, I do not necessarily accept Johnson's characterization of Professors Carter and
Kennedy as Hierarchical Majoritarian, nor do I consider them necessarily neo-liberal.
39. Neo-liberalism is probably best represented by the image created by Martin Luther King, Jr.'s I
Have a Dream speech: "[Olne day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: 'We
hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal."' Speech by Martin Luther King, Jr.,
I Have A Dream (1963), reprinted in BLACK PROTEST THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 349 (1987).
King's speech embraces the view that there are principles embodied in the Declaration of Independence
which belong to humanity: they are not the U.S. government's or white people's or anyone else's-they
are universal. If these principles were achieved, humanity's problems would be solved. The speech calls
for the end of racial, ethnic, and religious distinctions and is ultimately optimistic about the ability of
humankind to embrace these principles and resolve its problems.
40. "The liberal wants to judge a man in terms of his uniqueness and his universal humanity ....
Universalism thus goes hand in hand with individualism." R. BLAUNER, RACIAL OPPRESSION IN AMERICA
266-67 (1972), quoted in Peller, supra note 6, at 772 n.25.
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exist. It acquiesces to power; its universal morality risks embracing "might"
over "right." It becomes as escapist as fatalism because it essentially relies on
oppressors to end oppression.
Neo-liberalism remains a powerful perspective, however. In a jurispathic
society, neo-liberalism facilitates assimilation because it tends to accept the
prevailing social order as objectively "right." Furthermore, in the face of
assimilationist pressures" and unending "oppression," neo-liberalism provides
hope for the future, allowing some to live without despair.
The final view, individualism, is materialistic and personalized. Like
parochialists, individualists characterize life as brutal and burdensome. Howev-
er, they implicitly frame the battle, not as between the community and the state,
but rather between individual community members and the oppressive society.
Normatively, individualists consider futile group liberation beyond limited
individual emancipation. Individualism is characterized by despair; it rejects
either the existence of justice or the prospect of achieving it.42 Individualism
focuses on limited liberation within life's harsh constraints.43 Community
liberation for the individualist is only the aggregate of successful individual
liberation. 4
Each individualist creates an internal system for judging life and attaining
liberation. This system is accessible to others only through the individualist's
outward demands for autonomy and freedom-her demands for respect. The
individualist demands respect from all who will give it and respects only those
individuals who demand respect. Like the individualist's view of life, this ethic
of respect is brutal and violent in its operation.45 Individualist community
members are self-righteous with potentially opposing conceptions of respect,
41. Dissatisfaction, according to separatists, can be traced to the fact that in American institutional
settings Blacks are forced to adopt a culture other than their own. Boxill, Self-Respect and Protest, in
PHILOSOPHY BORN OF STRUGGLE: ANTHOLOGY OF AFRO-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY FROM 1917, at 190, 202-
03 (L. Harris ed. 1983).
42. "[Moderates say] the problems are so enormous and complicated that Negro militancy is a futile
irritation .... " B. Rustin, From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement, in THE
RADICAL PAPERS 347, 353 (I. Howe ed. 1966). Convicted prisoners "do not organize force against being
dragged [or beaten into] prison [indeed, they walk themselves there] because they know that if they wage
this kind of battle they will lose-very possibly lose their lives." Cover, supra note 32, at 1607-08.
43. Frazier once described some Blacks as "representative of the growing number of middle-class
Negroes who have a purely secular outlook on the world... they have neither an intellectual heritage nor
a social philosophy except a crude opportunism which enables them to get by in the white man's world."
E. FRAZIER, supra note 36, at 84. Individualists know all too well that this world is not their own. They
respond, as Frazier's Negro does, by creating a world around themselves.
44. Since oppression targets the community as a whole, individualists cannot ignore that community.
Thus, each individualist argues that she embodies the community. Acts committed upon community members
are committed upon the community and therefore the individualist. Individuals have the responsibility of
suffering on behalf of the community or avenging it. Cornel West identifies a similar perspective as the
first and fundamental norm at the "core of the prophetic Christian gospel": the "Christian principle of the
self-realization of individuality within community." C. WEST, PROPHESY DELIVERANCE! AN AFRO-AhMERI-
CAN REVOLUTIONARY CHRISTIANITY 16 (1982) (emphasis omitted).
45. Respect emerges from violence. F. FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 94 (1963) ("At the
level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from
his despair and inaction, it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect.").
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each claiming to embody the community and all pursuing self-interests under
the banner of community liberation.
The appeal of this "self-help" formula for liberation is limited, particularly
because all community members may not be able to liberate themselves. The
ruthless emphasis on personal concerns pits community members against each
other in a desperate scramble to get what pieces of the social pie are available.
Replete with in-fighting, the community never truly confronts the oppressive
state.46 Ironically, individualism's presupposition that everyone can liberate
himself assumes that the prevailing conditions of oppression can and will be
eliminated, even when created or maintained by the state. Individualism is,
however, successful when every community member is not concerned with
liberation. Finally, in a jurispathic state that promotes individualism and materi-
alism, individualism is likely to prosper.
B. The Legal Traditions of the Model: Evaluation of Acts
An understanding of each perspective's particular view of justice is revealed
by examining how its adherents conceive of and evaluate various acts of
violation. The evaluation of acts involves two processes. First, each perspecti-
ve's ethic determines how it reacts to the actor and the victim, given each per-
spective's empirical and normative assessment of the oppressed/oppressor
conflict. This construction produces four cases: (1) "One of us did something
to one of them"; 7 (2) "One of them did something to one of us";48 (3) "We
did something to ourselves"; and (4) "They did something to themselves." The
application of each perspective's normative view determines whether a given
perspective will perceive the actor and victim within the confines of the con-
flict. Second, each perspective incorporates its portrayal of the actor and victim
into its definition of the act. By using narrow or broad constructions of an act,
each perspective's normative ethic of liberation delineates a construction of
justice capable of evaluating life events which the community faces.4 9
1. Parochialism and the Just Act
Since the ethic of parochialism is material liberation of the group (revolu-
tion), the actor and victim are viewed within the context of a combative
46. Today this philosophy is associated with many Black youths. "The same repugnant, essentially
Victorian view of the inner-city [Bilack poor as incompetent and morally defective.., suffuses the political
discourse of the [Bliack petite [sic] bourgeoisie." Reed, False Profit-li: All for One and None for All,
NATION, Jan. 28, 1991, at 86, 90 (citing NV. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987) (noting "sharp
increase in social pathologies in ghetto communities")).
47. E.g., the Central Park rape.
48. E.g., the Howard Beach murder.
49. Mark Kelman's article, Interpretive Construction il the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 591 (1981), illustrates this process. Kelman argues that we employ conscious and unconscious
constructs to expand or constrain our view of an event. See id. at 592-600.
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relationship. Yet, even as parochialism embraces the we/they construction, it
is unable to resolve all of the resulting cases.
Under parochialism, it is meaningless, even comical, when "they do some-
thing to themselves." The parochialist is concerned with the community and
its struggle against "them." When "they" destroy themselves, "they" aid the
community's liberation. If the Howard Beach killers had murdered a white
youth, a parochialist would not care. The oppressive society is considered
inherently evil, abusive, and violent. When that violence is directed at the
oppressive community's members, it is a deserved consequence of the op-
pressors' very nature.
The first situation, "One of us did something to one of them," is always
justified because it is seen as a means of group liberation, an act of war against
the oppressor. At the very least, it is a reaction to the violent oppression of the
state.50 Conversely, in the second situation, "one of them did something to one
of us," the act is always wrong and unjustifiable because it represents the
oppression of the community. Here parochialism is most apparent.
The hard case for parochialism arises when "One of us does something to
another one of us." Parochialists cannot decide to support either the actor or
the victim because both are community members. Parochialism can initially
justify the act (the murder) as the result of the historical oppression. A victim
of that oppression, the actor isn't responsible for his actions. Ultimately,
however, parochialism must also condemn the act as counterrevolutionary, an
act of oppression itself. To this dilemma parochialism has no solution. Intra-
community violence is contrary to parochial liberation, but condemnation of
the act of a community member would be contrary to parochialism's communi-
ty unity ethic.
Parochialists construct acts broadly. Acts are tied to all the events of history
that were ever oppressive. The actor is not only the perpetrator, but represents
either (all of) the oppressed or oppressors. Parochialism is consciously deter-
ministic in how it views acts. The Howard Beach murderers do not have any
choice but to oppress and we can only expect the Central Park teenagers to lash
out at oppression in an attempt to "liberate" themselves.
If parochialism condemns the actor in the "us versus us" case, it must
necessarily discard its broad analytic frames. The only possible basis for that
result is that it is wrong anytime any actor hurts someone. Thus the actor in
the intracommunity murder is wrong and the Howard Beach killers are wrong,
but so are the teenage rapists in Central Park. Parochialism starts to resemble
50. As such, a Black parochialist who sees white people as the oppressor is not sympathetic to the white
woman raped and beaten in Central Park. The woman is an oppressor and it is her own fault as an oppressor
that violence occurred. The oppressor created the conditions that produced the violence in the teenage rapists.
Their actions are only attempts to liberate themselves or desperate attempts to lash out at the brutality of
the oppressors.
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neo-liberalism.51 Conversely, if parochialism condemns the victim, it must also
discard its breadth. The "they versus us" act is no longer immoral or a sign of
oppression. No acts are attacks on the community. The Howard Beach mob is
no longer a demonic symbol of community oppression; it is simply a gang of
murderers. As a result, parochialism reserves judgment on the "us versus us"
act, ignoring community members victimized by fellow community members.
2. Fatalism and the Just Act
In the fatalist's view, destiny, the will of God or some other phenomenon
beyond the control of man or the physical world is responsible for the oppres-
sor's acts. Ultimately, neither the differential views of acts and actors nor
manipulable analytic constructs illuminate this perspective, which transcends
the physical world of acts and judgment.
Fatalism sees the oppressed group members as the "children of God." The
price of disobedience is misfortune, and misfortune is the result of disobedi-
ence.12 Its assessment of acts is concerned primarily with the group members'
relationship to God and ignores the actions of other people.5 3 Indeed, whenev-
er a community member is victimized, it is necessarily either her own doing
or a test of faith.
Furthermore, while particular fatalistic dogmas often present quite developed
constructions of morality, fatalism is essentially amoral because it presents no
particular construction of right or wrong for any given scenario. No act is
necessarily just or unjust without a detailed dogma to guide moral thinking.
Indeed, even while it attempts to incorporate the group's history of oppression
into its view of acts, fatalism ignores oppression, relying on a higher order to
eliminate exploitation.
3. Neo-liberalism and the Just Act
Neo-liberalism rejects the more insular views of parochialism and fatalism.
Neo-liberals envision a world where "all [people] are created equal." An evil
act occurs by definition whenever one person commits a violent act upon
51. See infra notes 37 & 53-55 and accompanying text.
52. Given particular dogmas such as destiny or God's will, the fatalist can resolve the four cases. The
victim of intracommunity violence and the Howard Beach victim are dead because it was their destiny or
the will of God. Either they were martyred for holy persistence or punished for some earthly evil in the
face of earthly tribulations. Indeed, fatalism ignores the existence of an actor altogether, replacing the very
real people who perpetuated the murders with abstractions. Just as intracommunity murderers and the
Howard Beach lynchers are divested of volition, so are the rapists in Central Park. Their actions were
destined or forced by God and their punishment will be similarly destined, indicating either continued
oppression in an oppressive world, soldiers of God martyred in their incarceration, evil heathens abandoned
by their God, or simply unfortunates at the peril of their destiny.
53. Fatalism, like parochialism, is wedded to the we/they construction of the world and thus ignores
the victimization of the woman in Central Park as well as the Howard Beach perpetrators, casting them as
faceless oppressors. Similarly, acts by oppressors against oppressors are ignored.
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another person. To neo-liberals, the identities of the actor and victim are unim-
portant. They reject the racial identification of victims and perpetrators implicit
in the we/they construction in favor of a general theory that people as agents
should be free from interference. The neo-liberal does not deny the existence
of the we/they world. But the neo-liberal does assert that the we/they con-
struction (oppression) exists because people are viewed and treated as victims
and oppressors rather than equals.
When "one of us does something to one of them," we are evil because we
inflicted harm upon another person. As community members we damage our
own liberation by discounting the autonomy of others. Conversely, "they" are
evil when they inflict harm upon one of "us." In the neo-liberal's quest for
liberation, diminution of autonomy can never be justified by the we/they
construction, as it was never justified under the oppression that created the
we/they construction. When individual autonomy is compromised, the actor is
always wrong and evil. It does not matter if we commit acts upon "ourselves"
or they upon "themselves" since neo-liberalism sees one collective humanity. 54
To incorporate its normative view of humanity, which rejects the subjective
view of the historical construction of the community for either an objective
view of humanity or a subjective view of dominant people, neo-liberalism em-
ploys narrow analytic constructs. The act is couched in a narrow time frame.
It is viewed apart from other acts. The actor's intent is drawn narrowly to
reflect only his desire to produce the result under consideration and not wide
enough to include efforts at liberation or other motivations.55 Neo-liberalism's
conception of a world of equal and undifferentiated humans prevents it from
conceiving of the actors as anything but narrow, single individuals.
4. Individualism and the Just Act
Individualism's materialism makes its concept of autonomy different from
neo-liberalism's by stressing personal success instead of humanity. Individual-
ism emphasizes interpersonal relationships. It accepts that not all members of
the group are concerned with the liberation of themselves or the community.
It anticipates that some community members even reject the community and
work against it. Individualism recognizes its own ethic: community members
may aspire only for their own liberation, even at the expense of the community.
54. Here the killers in Howard Beach are as evil as the kids in Central Park. Furthermore, the victims
are no more tragic because the killings are interracial or intergroup. Neo-liberalism emphasizes the victim
and exalts life.
55. Neo-iberalism rejects determinism and focuses instead on individual will. Neo-liberalism considers
rules-proscriptions designed for particular situations without exceptions-preferable to broad standards
which leave room for tailoring to specific situations. See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-1701 (1976) (discussion of relationship between rules and
standards).
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Every act is judged by individual community members who claim to embody
the community. Thus, the absolute justice of the act becomes indeterminable.
Like the varying dogmas of fatalism,56 the subjective determination of
individualism is essentially amoral. The criteria for judging an act as justifiable
is whether one individual "respected" another. However, to the individualist,
respect is something to be demanded and is not given gratuitously. Individual-
ism constructs a draconian, nihilistic world of "an eye for an eye" where the
meek are trampled for their inability to assert dominion over themselves.
When anyone does anything to anyone else, the individualist asks, "who
has been disrespected?" A community member, disrespected by the actions of
another, is considered justified in avenging the initial transgression regardless
of whether the offending person is cognizant of the offense.5 7 The state is




Individualism espouses an "assumption of risk" doctrine. It does not matter
whether an actor consciously disrespected someone, she is nevertheless respon-
sible for the consequences of her actions. "Ignorance of the law" or ignorance
of disrespect are unacceptable defenses because they destroy responsibility for
actions and autonomy to act, central constructs of individualism.
No particular outcome is dictated by the we/they construction of life since
the demands of respect for a given person are largely indeterminable. By and
large, individualism breeds apathy to acts against other community members
except to the extent that the acts affect oneself or to the extent the effect of
those acts can be ascribed to oneself.59 Like fatalists, individualists ignore
community member perpetrators, imputing disrespect by their victims.60 The
we/they construction is only relevant to the individualist's views to the extent
that oppressors, the lynchers in Howard Beach and the victim in Central Park,
are largely ignored by the individualist. Individualists speculate about the
community member's relationship with the oppressor. The Central Park rape
56. See text accompanying notes 51-54.
57. Such an analysis resembles an application of Malcolm X's contextual analysis-nonviolence for
nonviolence and violence for violence as self-defense. Jones, Liberation Strategies in Black Theology: Mao,
Martin, or Malcolm? in PHILOsOPHY BORN OF STRUGGLE, supra note 41, at 229, 232.
58. Malcolm X's pre-Islam view that "the only thing I considered wrong was what I got caught doing
wrong" suggests that he viewed the law not as an abstract set of rights and wrongs but as a measure of the
respect demanded by the pseudo-individual he considered the state.
59. Accordingly, the intracommunity murder is reprehensible to an individualist to the extent that some
connection between the individualist and victim exists. Without a personal stake in the victim's life, the
individualist adopts a result-oriented view that assumes the victim must have deserved his fate. The
individualist would regard the Howard Beach victims in the same way.
60. The Central Park rapists are regarded similarly by the individualist. Barring some connection be-
tween the rapists and the individualist, the individualist is as likely to consider the rapists morally repugnant
as not. The individualist is capable of assuming that rape might not be morally reprehensible because no
abstract, objective "right" and "wrong" exists for the individualist.
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victim and the Howard Beach murders are deprived of their humanity; they are
objectified as universal oppressors.
61
Like fatalism, individualism simply manipulates narrow and broad analytical
constructs to produce a favorable result as determined by the individual victim
or actor's construction of justice.
C. The Four Perspectives in the Jurispathic State
Parochialism, fatalism, and neo-liberalism cannot survive as independent,
comprehensive jurisprudential constructs in the jurispathic state. Parochialism
fights a war that, by definition, it cannot win, destroying the community in the
process. Fatalism creates martyrs, destroying the community's members physi-
cally or psychologically.' Neo-liberals, while not destroyed by the jurispathic
state, provide no realizable alternative, ignoring the community's problems.
Thus, the community as a whole rejects neo-liberalism.
Individualism, presupposing no just order, focuses on the material improve-
ment and autonomy of individuals. This narrow materialistic prescription
bolsters individualism in a materialistic, jurispathic state. Individualism survives
because it implicitly accepts the state's power and the ethic of individual
material gain, even if it doubts the state's legitimacy. While least capable of
developing a moral order, individualism becomes the perspective most likely
to survive because it accepts oppression and the state and attempts to prosper
within that context. Since individualism is amoral, a state's jurispathic tenden-
cies tend to destroy structural morality in the oppressed community.
The jurispathic state effectively demands that an oppressed community
overturn the state to develop a moral order that can thrive. The jurispathic state
destroys, dismantles, and splinters the community, not only physically but also
philosophically. The community's strongest and most viable perspective makes
it necessarily subordinate to and dependent on the moral construction of the
state that oppresses it. The community's only other alternative is to put forth
inconsistent and contradictory combinations of views that, because of their
inconsistencies, cannot resolve issues of relevance to the community satisfacto-
rily.
61. Even as individualists ignore the oppressor, they are capable of justifying oppressor vengeance.
Because individualists look at results, they necessarily embrace "might" over "right." Indeed, only might
exists. Accordingly, individualists' reaction to the incarceration of the Central Park rapists assumes that the
state has reason to incarcerate, torture, or even execute the rapists. The individualist would likely not even
object to the murder of the rapists by their victim, even if she is an oppressor, because the rapists clearly
violated-disrespected-her.
62. The spiritual demands of fatalist constructions, because their logical conclusion is martyrdom or
suicide, force fatalists to adopt other perspectives to live in reality. The Nation of Islam, for example, is
as much a parochialist and individualist sect as it is a fatalist one. Cf. Reed, The Rise of Louis Farrakhan,
THE NATION, Jan. 21, 1991, at 1: "[Farrakhan] has propagated a vision of political separatism and a program
of moral rearmament, 'self-help' business development and an idiosyncratic brand of Islamic religion."
(emphasis added).
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III. APPLICATION TO CRITICAL RACE THEORISTS
Critical race theorists have put forth complex, combined views of justice
in the name of oppressed people that often obscure contrary views by other
people of color.63 The following examination of writings by Professors Mari
Matsuda and Richard Delgado illustrates this contention and shows how the
inadequacy or complete lack of a conceptual model compromises their work.
Section C suggests a method of avoiding the errors of Matsuda and Delgado.
A. Quail Calls: Excluded Voices, Confused Voices
Professor Matsuda makes several assertions about the value of the view-
points of scholars of color: "This article ... suggests a new epistemological
source for critical scholars: the actual experience, history, culture, and intellec-
tual tradition of people of color in America" and "those who have experienced
discrimination speak with a special voice to which we should listen." 6 Yet,
she fails to explain what these statements mean. At one point Matsuda, appar-
ently explaining the substantive value of her "excluded voices," says:
Outsider scholars have recognized that their specific experiences and
histories are relevant to jurisprudential inquiry. They reject narrow
evidentiary concepts of relevance and credibility... Not much time
is wasted in those communities arguing over definitions of justice.
Justice means children wi[th] full bellies sleeping in warm beds under
clean sheets. Justice means no lynchings, no rapes.. . . It means control
over one's own body. These kinds of concrete and substantive visions
of justice flow naturally from the experience of oppression."
While I accept Matsuda's contention that scholars' (and people's) histories
are relevant to jurisprudential inquiry and the construction of definitions of
justice, her conclusions following this contention are inconsistent and sometimes
wrong. Her statement implies a parochialist model for people of color, but then
fails to account for its own divergent perspectives, contradicting itself and
excluding divergent views. Matsuda's characterization implies uniformity of
belief. People of color are depicted as a cohesive, monolithic entity with a
singular, logically consistent, and inherently valuable view of moral right
developed via the state of oppression. The scholars of color seem unified and
undistinguishable, amassed and ready to assail the oppressor.66 Whereas Ran-
63. See supra, text accompanying notes 10-13; see also Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1784 (criticizing
Matsuda as having "a tendency to repress the diversity of ways in which similarly situated people conceptu-
alize the world.").
64. Matsuda, supra note 10, at 325, 324.
65. Matsuda, supra note 6, at 8.
66. Of course, a parochialist-like characterization among scholars of color is not new. See Fontaine,
Social Determinism in the Writings of Negro Scholars, 49 AM. J. Soc. 302 (1944) (work of Black scholars
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dall Kennedy argues that Matsuda stereotypes scholars via "the perceived
characteristics of the racial group with which the individual is associated,"'
Matsuda's characterization also stereotypes scholars via the parochialist perspec-
tive inherent in her implicit definition of community.
Notwithstanding the apparent similarity between parochialism and Matsuda's
characterization of people of color's views, her characterization presents several
substantive views which are inconsistent with parochialism. She assumes
parochialism's construction of acts when she states, "[Outsider scholars] reject
narrow evidentiary concepts of relevance and credibility." This construction
partially excludes fatalism and individualism which use both narrow and wide
evidentiary concepts. And she completely excludes neo-liberalism which rejects
altogether wide evidentiary constructions.
However, Matsuda's characterization abandons parochialism in its claim that
oppressed people necessarily condemn rape and lynching. Even if the oppressed
community is defined to include women generally (as opposed to only women
of color), Matsuda's work does not reflect upon why parochialists would
necessarily object to rape since parochialists cannot resolve intercommunity
crime. Nor does Matsuda suggest why a community influenced by parochialism
would object to raping oppressors (women or men). 8 Furthermore, Matsuda
does not recognize that individualists might sanction a lynching or rape, even
intercommunity lynchings or rapes, given certain constructions of respect.
When Matsuda asserts that oppressed people want control over their bodies,
can she deny that fatalism discounts the importance of control over one's body,
or that parochialism emphasizes group over individual or personal autonomy,
or that, even as individualism seeks such autonomy, it rejects the notion that
control over the body is ever possible?
More likely Matsuda is making a normative statement about her preference
for the program she outlines. If that is the case, through her formulation of a
contradictory and exclusionary jurisprudence, she has in effect destroyed her
initial argument that there are important views that attach to being oppressed.
She mischaracterizes people of color most when she casually asserts in the
passage that "not much time is wasted in those communities arguing over
definitions of justice." The very premise of this Note is that oppressed commu-
nities have four, not one, competing conceptions of justice. While babies with
full bellies may be an important concern of some community members, they
often more a defense of race than quest for truth).
67. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1787.
68. Former Black Panther Eldridge Cleaver once advocated the rape of white women as a means of
achieving liberation (and also advocated the rape of Black women for "practice"). While he later retreated
from this belief he described it as prevalent among many Black males. E. CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE 13-17
(1968). If Cleaver is an anomaly and his descriptions inaccurate, it is still true that women of color are more
frequently victims of rape than white women. Cf. Johnson, On the Prevalence of Rape in the United States,
6 SIGNS 136, 14243 (1980) (estimates based largely on statistics relevant to nonwhite populations); Gollin,
Comment on Johnson's "On the Prevalence of Rape in the United States," 6 SIGNS 346, 347 (1980) ("What
is chilling in these data are the consistently greater risks for non-white women..) (emphasis in original).
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quite frankly are not as important to others, depending upon the perspective
influencing a person's view of life, liberation, and justice.
Matsuda fails to outline why her combination attaches to oppression rather
than sheer preference. Her characterization takes the form of an empirical state-
ment, but comes with no proof. In the end, people of color who disagree with
her construction are marginalized much more than if they were excluded by the
oppressor since Matsuda claims that oppressed people, by definition, will agree
with her vision of justice.
B. Delgado: Racism and the Paternal State
Richard Delgado also asserts the academic value of listening to people of
color.69 In his critique of CLS, Delgado suggests that minorities have problems
with CLS's rejection of rights theory and its utopian vision. He then outlines
what he believes minorities seek in a legal theory.
70
Like Matsuda's characterization of people of color, Delgado's critique of
CLS appears to begin from a parochialist perspective. However, the substance
of Delgado's critique seems to embrace several perspectives as it moves from
a discussion of rights discourse to a critique of utopian vision. Civil rights law
may have given scholars of color an affinity for rights discourse. However, it
is one thing to say that minorities want to use rights theory because in current
legal discourse it is a means of limited liberation7t (a perfect individualist
view) and yet another to suggest that minorities are so fond of it that they
would not replace it if they could.
Rights discourse is inconsistent with parochialism. Rights discourse assumes
that community members are due a certain kind of treatment either because the
state draws legitimacy as a representative of all its citizens or because the state
is bound to act in accordance with certain universal or objective principles.
In either case parochialists reject rights discourse as promoting "false con-
sciousness" by misleading community members into believing that justice flows
from the state or universalism, instead of the community. Of course this mirrors
CLS's evaluation of the legal system's relationship with the oppressed.
While instrumental rights are consistent with individualism, rights-based
legalism is mandated by neo-liberalism, premised as it is on the concept of
abstract or natural rights. Delgado says that minorities are against CLS's
rejection of rights-oriented legalism. But while he appears to say this is because
69. Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95, 98 (1990)
("[Al11 people of color speak from a base of experience that in our society is deeply structured by racism.
That structure gives their stories a commonality warranting the term 'voice."') (footnote omitted); see also
Delgado, supra note 7.
70. Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 306, 309, 320-21 (1987).
71. See Williams, AlchemicalNotes: Reconstructing ldealsfrom Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 401, 403-05 (1987).
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the CLS critique removes the only means of liberation in a racist society, it is
not clear whether he argues for either instrumental or abstract rights. Without
a framework, he does not recognize any significant difference.
Even though all of the community's pure perspectives are utopian, parochi-
alism and individualism are rooted in material reality. The CLS utopian vision
is more like a fatalist view premised on brotherly love and altruism. The
utopian nature of the CLS program is then abstract and inconsistent with
parochialism and individualism which decry abstract liberation.
It might have been more valuable for Delgado, with a less stereotyped
conception of minorities, to note the inconsistency between the rejection of
rights that parochialism espouses and the utopian vision of CLS that resembles
closely fatalist and neo-liberal visions. By embracing a vision of minorities that
conflates parochial and neo-liberal perspectives, Delgado calls both wrong
without noticing how awkward (if not incompatible) the anti-rights views and
utopian visions of CLS are when taken together.
More frightening because it implies uniformity of belief, however, is
Delgado's evaluation of what minorities want. First, he says they want an end
to racism. From this conclusion he claims minorities want a formal, structured
society with a proactive program against racism.72 However, individualism
does not much care for an authoritative state nor is it much concerned with
racism except to the extent that it constitutes stereotyping and disrespect of the
individual's autonomy. Parochialism is only sympathetic to such a state if
minorities are in charge.
Nowhere is it clear why minorities want a state with countercoercive
structures designed to promote minority well-being.73 Such may be what
minorities need, but given the community's divergent views, it is necessary for
Delgado to express why such a program is mandated. Failing to do so he
marginalizes those minorities who possess divergent views.
C. Escaping the Errors: One Route
One way to escape the errors made in the Matsuda and Delgado selections
is to employ what Gerald Torres has called "conversation ending moves,"'74
stories in the first person. Professor Patricia Williams' Spirit Murdering the
Messenger75 successfully employs this technique. By using the personal voice
in her opening story Williams outlines a view she seems to accept, narrows that
view, and avoids ascribing that view to other community members while
72. Delgado, supra note 70, at 320, 321.
73. Id.
74. Address by Professor Gerald Torres, Yale Law School, James A. Thomas Lecture (Apr. 5, 1990).
75. Williams, supra note 21.
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simultaneously implicating the relevance of the view to the larger communi-
ty.76
The invocation of a narrative in the personal voice does not automatically
evade the problems outlined in the Matsuda and Delgado pieces; however, it
does clearly attach the ideas to the writer and to all those who affirmatively
profess their agreement with her. Narratives in the personal voice are inconsis-
tent with parochialist and fatalist constructions. The use of the personal voice
to express a parochial or fatalist view forces speakers to claim to speak for
others when they very often have no authority7 7 to do so. This is because
parochial and fatalist constructions minimize the significance of individuals'
opinions relative to group opinions. Conversely, individualism and neo-liberal-
ism demand deference to the individual's view.
When a writer advocates a variation of either individualism or neo-liberal-
ism, a personal story is often enough to establish the author's position. The
story in this context gives the reader the authority to determine the significance
of the story based on both the reader's view of right and the account of the
writer.78 The writer can argue that her experience mirrors that of other people,
but the experience is forever associated with the author.
When the writer espouses a parochial position, the distance between the
writer and the community is great and the connection unclear. Since the origin
of the writer's authority is not apparent, the author's claim is immediately
suspect. Absent political or institutional authority the writer must prove that
what she says a community believes is in fact true. Without such proof, the
writer is left to rely on the chance that her assertions mirror popular views.
IV. CONCLUSION
Paul Brest argues that scholars, lawyers, and judges, because of their class
and education, have a tendency to agree with libertarian views much more than
76. In the story she relates in the first part of her article Williams is angered when she is excluded from
a shop because it deprives her of individualism and the respect and dignity associated with it. She is
offended not only because her exclusion was obviously unwarranted, but also because she personifies the
community she identifies (and is identified) with. She knows some Black people would be let in; but more
importantly, she knows that others like her will be locked out. NWilliams, supra note 21, at 127.
She calls for the recognition of the individual's autonomy as a human being who is also oppressed-
a call for respect. Elsewhere, Williams notes that for slaves, sharecroppers, and prisoners, poverty and need
deprived them of their individualism, casting them as mere universal abstractions of man. For these people
she argues that rights imply respect and create a complete social being. Williams, supra note 71, at 416.
77. By authority I mean political authority derived from a legitimate political process (e.g., election
or appointment), institutional authority derived from a social position or status, academic authority found
in primary or secondary support (e.g., empirical data, statistical studies, or abstract theories), or popular
authority found when a speaker says what all or most members of the relevant community acknowledge
to be true. The statements of Matsuda and Delgado, which are parochial in some respects, seem to rely
primarily on popular authority, the legitimacy of which is questionable and largely fortuitous.
78. Delgado notes in his Plea for Narrative, "Stories and counterstories, to be effective, must be or
must appear to be noncoercive. They invite the reader to suspend judgment, listen for their point or message,
and then decide what measure of truth they contain." Delgado, A Plea For Narrative, supra note 9, at 2415.
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a sample of the mass public.7 9 If Matsuda and Delgado belong to Brest's class
of opinion and legal elites, their views can be expected to diverge from the
views of a "mass public" segment of the community of color and are reduced
to personal statements.
Specifically, I believe Matsuda and Delgado err in two ways. First, they
compromise the views of the people of color they claim to represent by not
acknowledging divergent views. They fail to recognize the components of their
own views of justice and how their views differ from divergent views in the
community for which they claim to speak.8" Second, they compromise their
scholarship. If scholarship is a quest for "truth," Matsuda and Delgado fail by
excluding divergent minority voices without justification.
More generally, because they fail to acknowledge that people of color
embrace a diversity of jurisprudential perspectives which can enrich legal
discourse, Matsuda and Delgado defeat their own premise that minority views
are valuable. They forget that there is reason to articulate and include the voices
of the excluded even if the excluded are no longer oppressed. Indeed, the very
existence of a jurisprudential perspective among oppressed people is compro-
mised by the monolithic definition of community resulting from to the lack of
a conceptual model.
The fact that Blacks were enslaved does not by itself dictate how a descen-
dant of slaves will view a particular act. It is the examination of the less
abstract, that element which lies between the historical constructions and their
ultimate conceptual conclusions (the four perspectives), that produces substan-
tive answers to moral questions. Yet the critical race theorists examined here
seem to suggest that substantive answers flow from the definition of the
community (e.g., a person's status as a descendent of slaves). Two of the
perspectives, the neo-liberal and individualist, even reject the community's
significance as a tool of liberation, calling community definition into question.
Oppressed people do not need legal commentators or a conceptual model
to make moral decisions. However, understanding the implications of moral
decisions requires both a framework connected to the historical construction
that defines the community as oppressed and a familiarity with that history. The
model presented in this Note can be used to categorize and understand moral
visions and actions. While it suggests that certain perspectives cannot answer
certain questions, it does not dictate how moral questions should be answered.
For example, it does not suggest what dogma might arise in a fatalist universe.
The model simply categorizes reactions to oppression and suggests the form
each reaction's view of justice would take.
79. Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 665 (1985).
80. To say scholarship must accurately portray a community does not mean it must be all-inclusive;
however, no scholarship should be confusing, unclear, or politically motivated.
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